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I N T R O D UCT I O N  BY  T H E  O R G A N I Z E R S 
This report contains the proceedings of the expert 
session of the EUNIC-FEUTURE Stakeholder 
Conference titled “Between Rapprochement and 
Rejection: Identity and Culture Drivers in the 
Europe-Turkey Relations” held at the Austrian 
Cultural Forum in Yeniköy, Istanbul, on September 
14, 2018. 
The idea for the conference first originated during 
the research conducted for the Horizon 2020 project 
FEUTURE (The Future of EU-Turkey Relations: 
Mapping Dynamics and Testing Scenarios).1 The 
conference brought together fifteen international 
partners to map the dynamics of EU-Turkey rela-
tions across six thematic dimensions (politics, secu-
rity, economics, energy, migration, and identity), 
examine underlying narratives and thematic drivers, 
substantiate the most likely future scenario(s) and 
assess its implications, and draw policy recommen-
dations. Two partners of the project, Koç University 
and Sabancı University, were mainly responsible 
for the thematic field of culture and identity, where 
they sought to analyze and understand the mutual 
representations of identity in the relations between 
Turkey/the Ottoman Empire and European coun-
tries since the 19th century through to the present 
day. Thanks to the efforts of Johanna Chovanec from 
the University of Vienna, who took part in the project 
as a researcher while based at Sabancı University, 
the interest in cultural interaction and identity 
issues in the relationship between the two sides led 
to a cooperation between these universities and the 
Austrian Cultural Forum in Istanbul, resulting in the 
aforementioned conference. The Austrian Cultural 
Forum is part of the cultural network EUNIC 
(European Union National Institutes for Culture).2 
1 Grant Agreement Number: 692976, http://feuture.eu/.
2 https://www.eunicglobal.eu/.
In 2018, the director of the Austrian Cultural Forum, 
Romana Königsbrun, served as president of the 
EUNIC Istanbul Cluster. She managed to secure 
financial support through EUNIC Global for this 
conference and ensured the active participation of 
EUNIC partners and the EU Delegation in Turkey at 
the conference.
By connecting the Horizon 2020 project to the more 
concrete and practical cultural work that EUNIC 
partners facilitate on the ground in Turkey, an 
academic exercise was linked to the work of cultural 
practitioners. Enhancing the dialogue between 
academia and cultural institutions was another long-
term objective of the stakeholder conference, which 
was also meant to feed into the process of updating 
the EUNIC 3-Year-Country Strategy for Turkey.
The research within the work package “Culture and 
Identity” of the Horizon 2020 project FEUTURE 
was characterized by a comparative approach that 
included an analysis of historical and present identity 
and cultural drivers through sources from the Euro-
pean as well as the Turkish context. The research 
findings3 have shown that identity representations 
of the respective Other were closely linked to the 
political status quo that underlines Europe-Turkey 
relations. The interdisciplinary and comparative 
outlook of the project also provided the focal point 
of the conference: the invited scholars focused on 
the linkages between politics and culture while at 
the same time comparing various forms of cultural 
production in Turkey and European countries.
3 Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Johanna Chovanec, Seçkin Barış Gülmez, and 
Bahar Rumelili, “Turkish and European Identity Constructions in the 
1946-1999 Period,” FEUTURE Online Paper No. 15, March 2018; Se-
nem Aydın-Düzgit, Johanna Chovanec, Bahar Rumelili, and Alp Eren 
Topal, “Turkish and European Identity Constructions in the 1815-
1945 Period,” FEUTURE Online Paper No. 4, July 2017. 
5In what follows are the contributions of the 
participants who took part in the expert session of 
the conference. The session titled “Representing 
and Construing the Other: Images of Europe and 
Turkey in Literature and Arts” focused on how the 
two sides have been represented in the literature 
and arts in both settings at different points in 
history. The contributions by Chovanec & Müller-
Funk, Nocera, and Dominik discuss mutual identity 
representations in the literature and arts at the 
national level (Austria and Turkey by Chovanec & 
Müller-Funk; Italy and Turkey by Nocera; Poland 
and Turkey by Dominik); Levin’s contribution takes 
a broader look and underlines the history of the role 
of identity in Turkey-Europe relations with a focus 
on its contemporary ramifications for the Euro-
pean Union’s relations with Turkey; and Costantini 
moves beyond identity representations to propose 
guidelines for a novel cultural policy in and for the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Sabancı University 
Romana Königsbrun, Austrian Cultural Forum 
Bahar Rumelili, Koç University 
Johanna Chovanec, University of Vienna
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P O ST I M P E R I A L  N A R R AT I V E S  I N  T U R K I S H  A N D  AUST R I A N  L I T E R AT U R E : 
A  C O M PA R I S O N
Johanna Chovanec and Wolfgang Müller-Funk 4 
The correlations between empires and their lega-
cies, as expressed in literature and the arts, have 
been the main focus of study in the framework of 
the interdisciplinary research project “Kakanien 
Revisited”5 (situated at the University of Vienna) 
and the follow-up project, “Post-imperial Narra-
tives in the Central European Literatures of 
Modernity”6 (situated at the University of Zagreb). 
Theoretical approaches from postcolonial studies 
were taken as a starting point for the transnational 
analysis of the imperial complex of the Habsburg 
monarchy and in a comparative view of other 
great powers such as the Russian and the Ottoman 
Empires, all of which disintegrated in the course or 
immediate aftermath of World War I. The research 
questions of the aforementioned projects address 
the relationship between the imperial center and 
peripheries as well as how economic dependencies 
4 Johanna Chovanec is a doctoral fellow at the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences (ÖAW) at the Department of Comparative Literature at Uni-
versity of Vienna as well as a doctoral fellow of the German Academic 
Scholarship Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes). 
Wolfgang Müller-Funk is a former professor of Cultural Studies at 
the University of Birmingham and at the University of Vienna; he is 
currently a 2019 senior fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences 
(IWM), Vienna.
5 “Kakanien” is a nickname for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy coined 
by the Austrian author Stefan Zweig in his novel The Man Without 
Qualities (1930–1943). The term “Kakanien” is derived from the 
German abbreviation K und K for kaiserlich und königlich (“imperial 
and royal”), used to indicate the status of Austria-Hungary as a dual 
monarchy. Kakanien Revisited, last modified October 31, 2009, http://
www.kakanien-revisited.at/.
6 The most recent volume published by researchers of the project is: 
Marijan Bobinac, Johanna Chovanec, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, and Je-
lena Spreicer (eds.), (Post)imperiale Narrative in den zentraleuropäis-
chen Literaturen der Moderne, series: Kultur – Herrschaft – Differenz 
(Tübingen: Francke, 2018), http://postimpnarrative.ffzg.unizg.hr/.
have been perpetuated after the downfall of the 
empires. Further research issues include analyses 
of the various constructions of “the Other” as 
promoted by the imperial elites in each society, for 
example, Orientalized Bosnia after its annexation 
by Austria-Hungary in 1878.7 How the concept 
of modernity has affected politics and framed 
discussions around the binary opposition between 
progress and backwardness is another important 
topic. In the Ottoman context the notion of Euro-
peanization was widely discussed in intellectual 
circles against the background of the Tanzimat 
reforms (1839–1878). Similarly, in the Habsburg 
monarchy catching up with modernity and trans-
forming Vienna into a modern European capital 
was a common discourse in the second half of the 
19th century.
Picking up these debates, literature is an excellent 
medium to trace back the transition from empire to 
nation state, the historical development of images 
of the imperial or national Self and its various 
Others, and the cultural and economic relation-
ships between the imperial center and peripheries. 
Moreover, and for the framework of this paper most 
importantly, novels capture how the empires rever-
berated after their dissolution in the course of the 
First World War. As Magerski points out, the narra-
tological foundation of the so-called postimperial 
7 Clemens Ruthner, “Habsburg’s little Orient. A Post/Colonial Reading 
of Austrian and German Cultural Narratives on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
1878-1918,” in WechselWirkungen: Austria-Hungary, Bosnia-Herze-
govina, and the Western Balkans, 1878 – 1918, ed. Clemens Ruthner, 
Diana Cordileone, Ursula Reber, and Raymond Detrez (New York/
Bern/Frankfurt/Berlin/Brussels/Vienna/Oxford/Warsaw: Peter Lang 
Monograph Series, 2015).
7novel is based on the experience of contingency: the 
narrative is closely linked to the loss of the imperial 
order as well as the following reorganization of 
social, political, and cultural life.8
In that sense, the proposition “post” in postimperial 
entails a broad range of connotations. It does not 
mean primarily an “after” in the sense of an abso-
lute end of the imperial lifeworld (Lebenswelt). On 
the contrary, the term refers to the continuing after 
effects of imperialism as well as to the far-reaching 
social, economic, and cultural ruptures connected 
to the downfall of political entities. In this paper we 
aim to shed light on how postimperial narratives 
are expressed in Turkish and Austrian literature. By 
means of literary texts from each context, we espe-
cially want to focus on the notion of melancholy as a 
main topos of the postimperial novel in Austria and 
Turkey. Nostalgic retrospection of the Habsburg 
and Ottoman Empires is a central theme in both 
countries’ literature and refers to different aspects 
such as the loss of order, stability, political weight, 
or cultural identity. The texts under analysis are 
written by Joseph Roth, Stefan Zweig, Claudio 
Magris, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Orhan Pamuk, and 
Elif Şafak.
In the field of cultural studies, there has been a vivid 
debate about certain “turns” over the last decade.9 
Both the narrative and the imperial turn are among 
the most recent trends in the humanities. What 
can be described as the “narrative turn”10 is the fact 
that all narrative phenomena can be seen through 
8 Christine Magerski, Imperiale Welten: Literatur und politische Theo-
rie am Beispiel Habsburg (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2018), 
30 f.
9 Doris Bachmann-Medick, Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den 
Kulturwissenschaften (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2009).
10 Wolfgang Müller-Funk and Clemens Ruthner (eds.), Narratives in 
Conflict (Boston/New York: De Gruyter, 2017); Anna Babka, Marlen 
Bidwell-Steiner, and Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Narrative im Bruch (Vi-
enna: Vienna Univ. Press, 2016), 7–18; Wolfgang Müller-Funk, The 
Architecture of Modern Culture. Towards a Narrative Cultural Theory 
(Boston/New York: De Gruyter, 2012), 1–108. 
a cross-disciplinary approach that focuses not 
primarily on the literary structures of texts but on 
the cultural function of narrations for collective 
entities from small groups to imagined communi-
ties such as nations. Narratives are characterized 
by the specific quality that they not only remember, 
invent, or reframe events of the past, but they also 
interpret them in a reproducing and memorizing 
act. They work on the past in the context and discur-
sive framework of the respective present. Conse-
quently, they establish a never-ending symbolic 
process of representation, connecting the past with 
today and creating a sense of values for groups as 
well as individuals. Thus, they construct identity 
as a sample of common interpreted events and 
qualities of the narrative community. The “impe-
rial turn”11 in cultural studies refers to the recent 
scholarly interest in the history, aftermath, and 
importance of empires for the political, economic, 
and cultural realities of today. The innovative 
aspect of the research projects “Kakanien revisited” 
and “Post-imperial Narratives” is that they aim at 
combining the narrative turn with the imperial one 
by describing empires as power complexes with 
various symbolic spaces. The ideological founda-
tion of empires is based on a heterogeneous, fluid, 
and at the same time often asymmetric, hegemonic 
narrative structure in which stories of different 
ethnic groups, various traditions, and religions find 
their place. 
Postimperial narratives can be understood as a 
process of storytelling in which the rupture, the 
breakdown of the empires, is dealt with collectively. 
There are different types of possible narratives; 
one is melancholic in the sense of Sigmund Freud’s 
essay Trauer und Melancholie, which addresses 
melancholy as the individual’s reaction to the unre-
solved loss of a beloved subject or an abstract idea 
11 Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander Martin, “The Im-
perial Turn,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7, 
no. 4 (2006): 705–712.
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such as one’s homeland. In literature, a melancholic 
narrative is characterized by the fact that the narra-
tion compensates for the loss of the object in the 
act of storytelling. A postimperial narrative evokes 
the past of the empire, its greatness and generosity, 
its diversity, and its often religiously influenced 
norms. This is the case in the myth of Moscow as 
the third Rome and successor state of the Byzan-
tine Empire in the era of Putin12 as well as in what 
Claudio Magris has called the Habsburg Myth in 
Austrian literature. This is also the case in what 
Johanna Chovanec, by analogy, has described as 
the Ottoman Myth in Turkish literature.13 There is 
a hidden narrative behind the melancholic gesture, 
the longing for a new political size and/or cultural 
attractiveness.
The Habsburg Myth is such a politically ambiva-
lent melancholic narrative.14 It was an Italian PhD 
student in the 1960s, Claudio Magris, who gave 
nostalgic retrospection to the world of the Casa di 
Austria in literature an explicit narrative format. 
According to Magris, the Habsburg Myth is a 
collective melancholic narration that generated its 
symbolic, identity-creating power in the Interwar 
period and became a central aspect in the Austrian 
nation-building process. In his famous book on 
12 Benedikt Stuchtey, Neujustierungen der Imperialismustheorien. 
Themen und Tendenzen der jüngeren internationalen Forschung, in 
Imperien, Nationen Regionen. Imperiale Konzeptionen in Deutschland 
und Russland zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Andreas Wirsching 
and Aleksandr Čubar’jan, 10–39 (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter/Olden-
bourg, 2018). 
13 Johanna Chovanec, “Istanbul: eine melancholische Stadt im Kontext 
des Osmanischen Mythos,” in (Post)imperiale Narrative in den zen-
traleuropäischen Literaturen der Moderne, ed. Marijan Bobinac, Jo-
hanna Chovanec, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, and Jelena Spreicer, 49–68, 
series: Reihe Kultur – Herrschaft – Differenz (Tübingen: Francke, 
2018).
14 Wolfgang Müller-Funk, “Das Melancholische und das Imperiale. Mit 
einem Seitenblick auf Joseph Roth,” in (Post)imperiale Narrative in 
den zentraleuropäischen Literaturen der Moderne, ed. Marijan Bobi-
nac, Johanna Chovanec, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, and Jelena Spre-
icer, 35 –48, series: Reihe Kultur – Herrschaft – Differenz (Tübingen: 
Francke, 2018).
the Habsburg Myth,15 Magris understands the 
myth as a narrative with a meta-historical kernel 
in which the historical reality is transformed into 
an illusionary world of yesterday. It is the image of 
a picturesque, secure, and orderly fairytale world. 
However, the myth as a founding narrative is at 
the same time a utopia projected into the future, 
focusing on Austria’s historically grown role in a 
unified Europe. Famous Austrian authors such 
as Stefan Zweig, Joseph Roth, Robert Musil, 
Hermann Broch, and many others are representa-
tives of this literary trend. The glorious account of 
the imperial past reacts not only to the breakdown 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but also to the 
problems of the new socialist regime in Russia and 
the decline of liberal national democracy that was 
undermined by National Socialism, Fascism, and 
Communism. Central to the myth is the literary 
yearning for the lost aspects of the monarchy, such 
as stability, a slow but functioning bureaucracy, or 
a harmonious coexistence of different groups and 
ethnicities. 
Although the most important period for the Habs-
burg Myth in Austrian literature is the time between 
1918 and 1945, its political origins can be traced 
back to the 19th century. One literary example of the 
official promotion and glorification of the Habs-
burg monarchy with the purpose of increasing the 
solidarity of the population with the empire is the 
so-called Das Kronprinzenwerk (“Crown Prince’s 
Work”).16 The 24-volume encyclopedia was initi-
ated by Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria-Hungary in 
1883 with the idea to present Austria-Hungary as an 
empire in which every province makes a contribu-
tion to a peaceful, multicultural, and liberal space, 
15 Claudio Magris, Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen österrei-
chischen Literatur (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2000).
16 Christiane Zintzen (ed.), Die österreichisch- ungarische Monarchie in 
Wort und Bild. Aus dem Kronprinzenwerk des Erzherzog Rudolf (Vien-
na/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 1999), accessed September 28, 2018, 
https://austria-forum.org/web-books/kategorie/kronprinzenwerk. 
9where cultural variety is accepted and welcome. 
It was a unifying project in favor of the United 
States of Austria—against the nationalism and 
anti-Semitism of the époque but also in contrast 
to the abstract cosmopolitanism in socialist 
narratives. In some of his plays (König Ottokars 
Glück und Ende, 1825; Ein Bruderzwist im Hause 
Habsburg, 1848) Franz Grillparzer (1791–1872), 
the first modern Austrian writer, refers to the long 
history of the Habsburg dynasty, the kernel of the 
Habsburg Myth. The Austrian novelettes (Novellen 
aus Österreich, 1877–1906) by Ferdinand von Saar 
(1833–1906) also belong to this narrative matrix—
as a melancholic perspective from the increasingly 
marginalized nobleman who is portrayed as one of 
the victims of the “progress” that goes hand in hand 
with the decline of the Austrian empire.
The Habsburg Myth celebrated its triumph after 
World War I in the 1930s. In a short novella (The 
Bust of the Emperor, 1934), the famous Austrian 
writer Joseph Roth (1894–1939) presents his main 
protagonist as the ideal subject of the disappeared 
empire. Franz Xaver Morstin is the prototype of a 
multicultural Austrian human being: transnational, 
neither Polish, Italian, nor German as his first 
name might suggest, a brave soldier, and multi-
lingual, speaking nearly all European languages. 
He is everywhere at home, especially within the 
monarchy. For this aristocrat, belonging to a nation 
is meaningless in comparison to the lost colorful life 
in the monarchy. Hence, he is not willing to accept 
that the village of his family has now become part 
of the new Polish nation-state and denies removing 
the bust of his emperor Joseph, which he had 
erected in front of his mansion. Coming in conflict 
with the new authorities, he decides together with a 
Catholic priest and a Jewish rabbi to bury the bust 
in the cemetery of the village. Afterwards he leaves 
his homeland by concluding with the metaphor that 
only his old home, the monarchy, was a large house 
with many doors and rooms for different peoples.17 
For the Jewish writer Stefan Zweig (1881–1942), 
the monarchy is also the object of melancholic 
yearning. In his famous memoire and essay, The 
World of Yesterday (1942), he praises the empire as 
an open world of peace and cultural richness.
From today’s point of view, Magris’ book about the 
Habsburg Myth contributed to the myth that it had 
once analyzed: with its melancholic undercurrent, 
the text can now be rather read as a nostalgic docu-
ment in the tradition of Zweig and Roth, perpetu-
ating their literary discourse. To some extent the 
myth is still relevant for the Austrian symbolic 
space of today. In this perspective, Austria is seen 
as a postimperial diplomatic player and, because of 
its heritage, as a cultural power in Central Europe. 
The imperial past has also been relevant for many 
public intellectuals and poets in (former) Commu-
nist countries (e.g., Milan Kundera, György Konrad, 
Vaclav Havel) in their discourse on Mitteleuropa.18 
As Zweig has pointed out in The World of Yesterday, 
Central Europe, the former space of the Habsburg 
Empire, was the central overlapping transnational 
European space for creating civil societies. From 
this point of view, the Old Austrian melancholy 
carries a utopian meaning: the Monarchy as a multi-
national complex is the harbinger of a new, peaceful 
postwar Europe and of the European Union. In his 
influential book, the founder of the idea of a Pan-
European Union, Richard Coudenhove-Calergi, 
interpreted the idea of an integrated Europe as a 
project in the tradition of the Habsburg Empire.19
17 Joseph Roth, Der Leviatan. Erzählungen (Munich: dtv, 1976), 139.
18 Jiři Holý, “Mitteleuropa in der Auffassung von Milan Kundera und 
Václav Havel,” Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch 37 (1991): 27–36. 
19 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan Europa- Der Jugend gewidmet 
(Munich/Vienna: Amalthea, 1987).
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As a postimperial narrative expressed in literary 
texts, the Ottoman Myth20 in Turkish literature can 
be viewed analogously with the Habsburg Myth in 
Austrian literature. Central to the Ottoman Myth is 
a nostalgic retrospection of the lost Ottoman past. 
Melancholic themes in novels deal with various 
aspects of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire such 
as its multicultural and multi-ethnic population, 
the political importance and wealth of Istanbul as 
the empire’s capital, and the cultural richness and 
authenticity of the Ottoman lifeworld. Melancholy 
in Turkish literature has a long discourse history, 
its origins dating back to the second half of the 19th 
century and leading up to the inflationary presence 
of the Ottoman Empire in postmodern literature. 
When looking at the Ottoman context, melan-
choly is connected to a discussion about cultural 
authenticity and an anticipated loss of identity. 
This debate had already started in the course of 
the Tanzimat reforms and was picked up by many 
famous intellectuals of that era. Published in the 
1870s, the first Ottoman novels were especially 
concerned with addressing questions such as how 
increased Westernization affected Ottoman culture 
and whether or not European cultural values 
should be fully appropriated or if only aspects of 
technical progress should be adopted. For example, 
Ahmet Mithat’s (1844–1912) novel Felatun Bey 
Ile Rakim Efendi (1876),21 which tells the story of 
two young men, created a new literary figure that 
would become a repeating topos in late Ottoman 
literature: the züppe. The züppe is a dandy or snob 
who imitates Western languages, dress codes, and 
behaviors on a superficial level. He forgets the 
moral, Islamic values he grew up with, loses his 
20 Johanna Chovanec, “Melancholie in der Literatur als Ausdruck des 
Habsburgischen und Osmanischen Mythos,” in Turns und kein Ende. 
Aktuelle Tendenzen in Germanistik und Komparatistik, ed. Elke Sturm-
Trigonakis, Olga Laskaridou, Evi Petropoulou, and Katerina Karakassi 
(New York/Bern/Frankfurt/Berlin/Brussels/Vienna/Oxford/Warsaw: 
Peter Lang, 2017), 171–186.
21 Ahmet Mithat, Felatun Bey Ile Rakim Efendi (Ankara: Nilüfer, 2013).
identity, and becomes a caricature. Felatun repre-
sents a misinterpreted, false, artificial (yanlış ve 
yüzeysel Batılılaşma) Westernization and makes a 
fool of himself.22 By contrast, Rakim Efendi fulfills 
the ideal of “half Westernization.” He knows many 
languages and becomes a successful translator. 
He educates himself in certain fields of European 
cultures yet does not get detached from his own 
background and values. The novel expresses a fear 
of loss of cultural identity connected to the reform 
activities in the Ottoman Empire and the political 
as well as economic dependency on the European 
powers. This notion can be regarded as the origin of 
the melancholic discourse in Turkish literature.
Whereas melancholy was a main theme in Austrian 
literature in the Interwar period, nostalgic refer-
ences to the Ottoman Empire were rare in Turkish 
literature in times of nationalism and Kemalism. 
Against this background, the novels of Ahmet 
Hamdi Tanpınar (1901–1962) can be regarded as 
exceptional. In his oeuvre, the Turkish writer and 
literary scholar explores perceptions of Europe and 
the search for a Turkish identity beyond Kemalist 
paradigms. Described as a melancholic (hüzünlü) 
author in Orhan Pamuk’s novel Istanbul, Tanpınar’s 
literary texts such as his essayistic compilation Beş 
Şehir (“Five Cities”)23 (1946) deal with elements of 
the lost Ottoman heritage such as the transforma-
tion of the urban space in Istanbul, the empire’s 
former capital city, or the absence of the former 
multicultural population that gave way to a largely 
homogenous, Muslim Turkish majority society. 
Furthermore, Tanpınar’s literary melancholy points 
toward increasing Westernization, which distances 
Istanbul and its inhabitants from an idea of cultural 
authenticity that can only be found in continuity 
22 Selami Çakmakci, “Gösterişçi Tüketim Bağlamında İki ‘Alafranga 
Züppe’ Tipi: Bihruz Bey ve Felatun Bey,” Journal of Turkish Studies 9, 
no. 9 (2014): 338.
23 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Beş Şehir (Istanbul: Milli eğitim basımevi, 
1969).
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with the past. Cultural authenticity in times of 
Europeanization and Kemalist reform activities is 
also a central concept in Tanpınar’s novel Huzur 
(1948, translated as A Mind at Peace).24 The main 
protagonist Mümtaz, a melancholic intellectual, 
feels disoriented in postimperial Turkey and is in 
search of an identity that combines elements of the 
European as well as Turkish culture.
However, it is only in the 1980s that we can observe 
an increased publication of historical novels set in 
Ottoman times or postmodern novels combining 
fictional with historical elements. Melancholy has 
become a main topos in Turkish literature and is 
often explicitly expressed. In his novel Istanbul 
(2003) the noble prize-winning author Orhan 
Pamuk (1952–) refers to the collectively felt hüzün, 
an emotion he describes as almost tangible and 
omnipresent in Istanbul.25 Pamuk mourns the lost 
glory, power, and wealth that were once charac-
teristic of the former (imperial) Ottoman capital. 
His inclusion of black and white photographs by 
the famous photographer Ara Güler (1928-2018) 
accentuates the melancholic discourse, while, for 
instance, the crumbling and already destroyed 
konaklar, Ottoman mansions, represent a melan-
cholic motif. 
There are numerous literary examples that demon-
strate how postimperial melancholy expressed 
through literature often pursues different political 
targets. For example, Ahmet Ümit’s (1960–) crime 
novel Istanbul Hatırası (“Memory of Istanbul”) 
(2010) puts forward a critique of capitalism and its 
unsustainable practices as its main topic focusing 
on how Ottoman and Byzantine buildings in the 
Fatih neighborhood of Istanbul have given way 
to new shopping malls and hotels.26 Elif Şafak’s 
(1971–) essays such as “Life in the Islands” (2006) 
24 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Huzur (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1949). 
25 Orhan Pamuk, İstanbul - Hatıralar ve Şehir (Istanbul: YKY, 2013).
26 Ahmet Ümit, İstanbul Hatırası (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2010).
describe a multicultural, multilingual Ottoman 
Empire as a positive and harmonic societal model, 
or a political counter model.27 However, what most 
novels have in common is that they, on the one hand, 
use the Ottoman Empire as an aesthetical frame of 
reference (music, literature, etc.), and on the other, 
they highlight Turkey’s history as a distinguishing 
feature in relation to European identities. 
It is evident that the Habsburg Myth as expressed 
by authors such as Zweig and Roth envisions a 
clear European and transnational structure. The 
Ottoman Myth in texts by writers such as Pamuk 
and Tanpınar can be read as a postimperial narra-
tive that tries to integrate Western and Turkish 
symbolic elements by bridging the gap between the 
East and the West. Both melancholic traditions can 
be understood as counter-models to the homog-
enizing nation-building narratives and, at the same 
time, as political utopias for the postimperial space. 
They each entail a traditional moment that tries to 
integrate the imperial past into the future of Europe 
and its Eastern neighborhood. Another similarity is 
that the origins of the myths can be traced back to 
the 19th century. In the Austrian case nationalism is 
seen as a dramatic threat to the political and cultural 
integrity of the monarchy. Similarly, in the Ottoman 
Empire it is a fear of losing one’s own culture and 
identity in the process of Westernization and 
reform activities. In both cases, literature is the 
preferred medium to convey an alternative image of 
the empire, not as a prison of peoples (Völkerkerker) 
but as an open house for different groups.
27 Elif Şafak, “Life in the islands…” August 27, 2006, accessed September 
27, 2018, http://www.elifsafak.us/yazilar.asp?islem=yazi&id=416. 
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M Y T H S  A N D  R E P R E S E N TAT I O NS : 
E N C O U N T E R S  B ET W E E N  I TA LY  A N D  T U R K E Y  I N  T H E  1 9 5 0 s
Lea Nocera 28 
The protracted and controversial relationship 
between Turkey and Europe has long been the 
topic of several studies and research. Toward 
understanding these relations, a historical-political 
approach or an analysis in the framework of inter-
national relations is generally favored.29 In my 
paper, I would like to underline how, by examining 
some aspects of the socio-cultural history that 
links Turkey and Europe, it is possible to promote 
an innovative approach to the study of their rela-
tionship. In particular, I focus on the relations of 
cultural exchange between Turkey and Italy in the 
period after World War II.
In this period, relations between Turkey and 
Europe were intense and continuous. During the 
Cold War years, Turkey, as the far eastern border of 
Western Europe behind the Iron Curtain, adopted 
a strategic position on geopolitical issues. Together 
with Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, Turkey was 
considered part of the South European countries 
in official sources. For instance, official documents 
about migration movements in post-WWII Europe, 
especially those concerning the recruitment of the 
Turkish labor force for German industries until 
1984, neither stress Turkey’s lack of belonging to 
28 Lea Nocera is an assistant professor in Turkish Studies, L’Orientale 
University, Naples, Italy; lnocera@unior.it. This paper is part of larg-
er, ongoing research on the emergence of mass culture in Turkey be-
tween the 1940s and 1970s.
29 This happens because, for what concerns the 20th century, at the core 
of the analysis are the relations between Turkey and the European 
Union: for instance, Birol Yeşilada, EU-Turkey Relations in the 21st 
Century (London: Routledge, 2012); Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Natha-
lie Tocci, Turkey and the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2015). 
the EU nor its peculiarity as a Muslim country.30 
Later, because of the following developments in 
the European Community and the writing of a 
European historiography strongly affected by the 
building of the EU, the definition of Turkey as a 
country belonging to the South European group of 
countries has been dismissed if not forgotten. This 
is not only a geographical definition but a political 
one, testifying to the position of Turkey vis-à-vis 
Europe and vice-versa. 
Since 1945, Turkey has belonged to the Western 
European and U.S. military security zone. As 
Zürcher explains, “The post-war era was a period of 
intensified incorporation of Turkey into the world 
capitalist system, not only in the economic field, but 
also in the realms of foreign policy and defense.”31 
Having abandoned the Kemalist foreign policy 
doctrine of cautious neutralism, Turkey became 
a solid part of the political and military structures 
that the United States and its allies built up to 
safeguard the continued existence of democracy 
and free enterprise. Within the context of the Cold 
War, Turkey’s entry into various international 
organizations (OEEC, Council of Europe, NATO, 
as well as the European Broadcasting Union) 
seemed to confirm the notion that the country had 
finally gained full status among Western nations. 
The intensification of relations between Turkey 
and Western countries was yet not only a matter of 
30 I have extensively discussed this issue in Lea Nocera, Manikürlü Eller 
Almanya’da elektrik bobini saracak (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayin-
lari, 2018).
31 Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London/New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1993).
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military and international affairs but reflected also 
in socio-cultural relations, in the many opportuni-
ties for contact and exchange between the societies 
and in daily life. In seemingly frivolous events such 
as beauty pageants, Turkey was indeed a European 
country, which helped shape its social imagery. For 
instance, in 1952, Günseli Başar, a twenty-year-old 
girl from Istanbul, great-niece of the Grand Vizier 
Halil Rifat Pasha, represented her country at the 
Miss Europe beauty contest held in Naples, Italy, 
and became Turkey’s first ever Miss Europe winner 
on August 20, 1952. Her nomination confirmed both 
in Turkey and Europe that the Turkish republic 
deserved to be considered as a European country, 
and this had a political meaning. This mirrored a 
similar event in 1932, when Miss Turkey Keriman 
Halis was selected as Miss Universe.32 
Europe has always been an inspiration for Turkey, 
even before its foundation, since the Ottoman times, 
and European culture as well has been a landmark 
in the education of Turkish elites since the 18th 
century. During the 1950s, in the beginning years of 
mass culture, while remaining a reference point for 
the upper bourgeoisie, which still sent its children 
to study in France, Germany, Austria, or going on a 
cruise around the European ports, Europe became 
also a reference to dreams of modernity within the 
emerging Turkish urban middle class. In spite of 
the so-called Americanization of Turkish society, 
which was probably much more an idea than a fact, 
Europe shaped cultural models inside Turkey, at 
this time not only for the elite but also for a larger 
32 The achievement of Keriman Halis as Miss Universe precisely “was 
celebrated as a national victory for the young Kemalist Republic”; 
Amit Bein, “There She is, Miss Universe: Keriman Halis goes to Egypt, 
1933,” in Middle Eastern and North African Societies in the Interwar 
Period, ed. Kate Fleet and Ebru Boyar, 144–163 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 
2018). On beauty pageants in Turkey, see also: Ada Holland Shissler, 
“Beauty Is Nothing to Be Ashamed Of: Beauty Contests As Tools of 
Women’s Liberation in Early Republican Turkey,” Comparative Stud-
ies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, no. 1 (2004): 107–122.
part of the society, through cultural commodities 
belonging to the realm of popular culture.33 
Italy as a Myth
Popular music and cinema, therefore, were the 
main vehicles for a modern, up-to-date lifestyle 
inspiring the new urban middle class. Being aware 
of the fact that European education and culture had 
always been a sign of social and class distinction, the 
emerging urban bourgeoisie longed to access Euro-
pean cultural life, and Italian popular culture satis-
fied it. By the late 1940s and through the 1950s and 
1960s, Italian cultural commodities were strongly 
promoted and diffused in Turkey. If the upper class 
could have the Piccola Orchestra at a gala dinner in 
the Hilton Hotel in Istanbul, the middle class could 
at the same time listen to Mina’s or Milva’s records. 
The presence and the relevance of culture coming 
from Italy is in fact still vivid in the popular memo-
ries of the period and has contributed undoubtedly 
to shape a shared imaginary about modernity, 
and also European modernity, in Turkey. Italian 
movies, popular songs, comics, and photo stories 
were quickly imported, translated, and distributed 
all over Turkey and seduced a large public ready 
to follow the Italian stars (actors, actresses, and 
singers) on their Turkish tours. Italian singers 
33 Cultural production in Turkey and the outset of the Turkish cultural 
industry have very often focused on the question of imitation and/or 
emulation of Western cultural models, whether European or Amer-
ican. Particularly, the “Americanization” of Turkish society from the 
1950s seems to be an undisputed fact. Even if it is evident that in po-
litical discourse the United States became the so-called “New West” 
(Yeni garp), and that U.S. pioneered mass consumption became a cen-
tral symbol, it is not clear to what extent it effectively affected Turkish 
society, practices, and aspirations. As Kaelble argues, for Europe, the 
Americanization of European consumption is debated and is a “still 
misleading simplification.” H. Kaelble, A Social History of Europe 
1945-2000 – Recovery and Transformation After Two World Wars 
(New York/Oxford: Berghahn Book, 2013). For Turkey, it seems nec-
essary to investigate how European patterns of consumption, with 
their own styles, variety, and traditional links to the Turkish social 
elite, persisted to be seductive and incisive for an emerging urban 
bourgeoisie. The success and the mass consumption of Italian cultural 
commodities seem to push in this direction.
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often gave concerts in Istanbul, and the new weekly 
cultural magazines (e.g., Ses, Yildiz, Diskotek) 
followed them closely, describing the details of their 
concerts and providing information for fans.
Italy was an attractive destination, where change 
and the future appeared possible and closer. It 
mirrored a Southern European society, a Mediter-
ranean country, which in some ways was perceived 
as a model of progress and development due to its 
“economic miracle” and its successful cultural 
products (like movies). As the Turkish cultural 
magazines of the period show, Turkish girls dreamt 
of having the chance to go to Italy and become 
actresses or pop singers, not different from their 
peers in Southern Italy dreaming to go in Rome and 
change their lives. In the eyes of the younger genera-
tion in Turkey, in the 1950s, Italy was a true myth.
The Italian Representation of Turkey
On the other side of the Mediterranean, however, 
despite all the political and social changes in Italy, 
representations of Turkey were not changing quickly 
or radically. Italy after WWII was also deeply 
changing and actively engaged in international rela-
tions. During the Italian economic miracle, Italy set 
up solid relations with many countries, even behind 
Europe and the United States. Enrico Mattei, public 
administrator and founder of Italian energy company 
Eni in 1953, who negotiated important oil conces-
sions in the Middle East and broke the power of inter-
national oligopolies, was one of those brilliant figures 
who fostered stronger connections outside European 
borders. In the same direction, Italy established the 
first Italian cultural institute in Turkey, in Istanbul, 
in 1951 and two years later another in Ankara. 
Italian society was changing rapidly—as neorealist 
cinema attentively showed—and was curious about 
other cultures and countries. Nevertheless, in those 
years the image of Turkey or of Turkish people did 
not differ that much from a still vivid Orientalist 
stereotype. It was not only because of the legacy 
of the older Italian culture—though, for instance, 
The Turk in Italy, the opera (buffa) by Gioacchino 
Rossini first performed in 1814, gained a renewed 
fortune during the 1950s. 
Gina Lollobrigida, Yeni Yıldız, July 1, 1955
Simona Silva, Cover of Yeni Yıldız, July 8, 1955
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A couple of examples reveal to what extent the 
representation of Turks was not substantially 
affected by the changes in society or in foreign 
relations. The first one is a comedy film, Un turco 
napoletano (Neapolitan Turk), directed by Mario 
Mattoli, produced in 1953, and starring Totò, 
the most popular Italian comedian of all time. 
“Neapolitan Turk” is set in Naples and Sorrento in 
the second half of the 1800s. It is based on a series 
of funny situations and misunderstanding that 
arise from the figure of a Turk, a eunuch who, as the 
spectators know, proves to be a great womanizer 
and gains the sympathy of all the girls in the town. 
The fake eunuch is played by Totò, who gives the 
film portentous comic vein. The film is a classic 
example of cinematic Italian comedy in the 1950s, 
based on the indissoluble presence of two elements: 
comedy and sex. But still more, here, along the 
entire story, it gathers all the typical clichés about 
the Turkish and Middle Eastern world: the harem, 
belly dancers, fez, and the Arabian melody from 
Franz Hünten’s “Fantaisie arabe, op. 136” (1845), 
a classical, stereotypical theme of Middle Eastern 
music and culture. Classical elements of the 
Oriental world, where Turks are often confused 
with Arabs, continue to appear. This not only 
reflects a representation of Turkey completely 
disconnected to all the changes that occurred at 
those times in both countries, Turkey and Italy, but 
also in relations between the two.
A scene from the film “Neapolitan Turk”
Another example of this Italian perception concerns 
a real Turk in Italy, in this case a woman: Ayşe Nana, 
a Turkish actress, dancer, and stripper of Armenian 
origin whose story inspired the late Italian director 
Federico Fellini to make his classic film La Dolce Vita. 
Ayşe Nana, who began her career in 1954 at the age of 
fourteen before moving to France then Italy to become 
a belly dancer, shot to fame when she performed a 
striptease at a restaurant in Rome in 1958. Police 
raided the Rugantino restaurant while the party was 
still in progress and closed it for offending public 
morality, but a photographer who shot the entire 
sequence managed to get out with a roll of pictures of 
Nana stripping to her underwear (figure). Poster for Un turco napoletano (Neapolitan Turk), film di-
rected by Mario Mattoli, 1953
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The photos created a scandal when they were 
published several days later, but Fellini seized on 
the episode as an inspiration for a film he had been 
wanting to make about the idle, wealthy cafe society 
in Rome. Nana then married an Italian film director 
and went on to play small parts in several Italian films. 
She was one of the last major protagonists of Rome’s 
Dolce Vita years. Her image, sharply contrasting the 
elegant and discrete Miss Europe, perfectly corre-
sponded to the Oriental lust associated with women 
and the Middle East.
Miss Europe Günseli Başar – Cumhuriyet, August 21, 1952
Lo Specchio, October 9, 1960
One of the scandalous pictures shot at the Rugantino by 
Tazio Secchiaroli in 1958, published also in the weekly 
magazine L’Espresso, August 6, 1958
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Conclusions
While in Turkey Italy represented a symbol of Euro-
pean culture and provided narrations of modernity 
and progress through its cultural products—which 
were much closer to Turkish society and to the 
emerging urban bourgeoisie, as well as their imagery, 
than North American or North European models—
Italian representations of Turkey were still strongly 
influenced by rooted stereotypes and affected the 
definition of the most common image of Turkey 
and Turkish people. These images were reproduced 
despite the continuous and stable cultural and 
commercial relations between the two countries.
It is important and useful to investigate these rela-
tions and the diffusion of Italian cultural produc-
tion in the decades following WWII. Focusing on 
the distribution and the influence of Italian (and 
European) culture in Turkey shows intense cultural 
relations between those countries, which were up to 
now mostly disregarded. As aforementioned, these 
relations (namely South-South relations in the 20th 
century) have not been sufficiently explored because 
of a European historiography strongly influenced by 
the EU process. A study of transnational connections 
in the cultural field can reveal undiscovered socio-
historical aspects of the Turkey-Italy relationship 
and open up new perspectives in the historiography 
of Europe, as well as in the formulation of European 
identity and Europeanization, and can also contribute 
to coping with ongoing clichés and stereotypes. 
Ayşe Nana, https://retrorambling.files.wordpress.
com/2014/04/6645_nana_01.jpg
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“ W H E R E  I S  T H E  D E P U T Y  O F  L E H I STA N ? ” : 
T U R K E Y  A N D  P O L A N D  –  V I G N ETT E S  F R O M  S H A R E D  H I STO RY
Paulina Dominik 34
When one speaks of Turkey’s relations with Europe, 
its contacts with Poland may not come to mind as the 
most obvious example, despite the fact that in the 
early modern period the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth—the predecessor state of modern-day Poland 
known in Ottoman Turkish as “Lehistan”—was the 
European country that shared the longest border 
with the Ottoman Empire. In this context, it is worth 
recalling that in 2014 Poland and Turkey celebrated 
the 600th anniversary of diplomatic relations, which 
was accompanied by a rich cultural program that 
aimed at mutual rediscovery and deepening of coop-
eration in various fields.35 It was a unique anniversary 
on the European, and even world, scale, as not many 
states can boast of such an enduring history of mutual 
contacts. The memory of several centuries of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman 
Empire as neighbors is still alive in Polish tradition 
and culture. What is striking is that the present 
Polish perception of Turkey is loaded with national 
mythology that comes from the turn of the 20th 
century.36 Its foundations lie in the works of the Polish 
Nobel Prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz (1856–1916) 
from over a hundred years ago. In his novels—written 
to “upraise hearts” of Poles living under foreign 
rule—Sienkiewicz often used the image of a “villain 
Turk” as an actual substitute for a “Russian” in order 
to avoid Tzarist censors who were closely following 
the content of publications in Polish. The faraway 
34 Paulina Dominik is a doctoral fellow at the graduate school Global In-
tellectual History at the Freie Universität Berlin.
35 A number of events plus two big exhibitions highlighted the Turkish-
Polish relationship.
36 Jacek Purchla, “Edytorial/ Editorial,” in Herito (Turcja – Türkiye – 
Turkey) 14 (2014): 1. 
“Turk” or “Muslim” stood in for the close-by “enemy” 
under whose yoke Poles lived at the time. By the time 
Sienkiewicz had published his novels, thousands of 
Polish political émigrés had found refuge within the 
Ottoman borders, and the most renowned Polish 
Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) 
had drawn his last breath in Istanbul in 1855 while 
involved in the political mission of formation of the 
Polish military units in the Ottoman army during the 
Crimean War (1853–1855).
The following paper is by no means an attempt to 
present or even sketch these relations over the past 
six centuries. Rather, it consists of a few vignettes 
that will provide some insights into the rich history 
of Polish-Turkish contacts.
There is no doubt that the “Turkish threat” played 
a substantial role in Polish internal political propa-
ganda from the battle of Varna in 1444 onwards. 
Together with the battles of Hotin (1621, 1673) and 
the siege of Vienna (1683), they served to construct 
a Polish self-image as a Christian and European 
state.37 Antemurale Christianitatis—“the bulwark 
of Christianity”—is a vital component of many 
national cultures in Central Europe, and Poland 
and Poles are not an exception. In that period 
numerous anti-Turkish pamphlets, called turcyki or 
turcica, were published in Poland in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century and were reminiscent of 
37 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “A historical outline of Polish-Ottoman polit-
ical and diplomatic relations,” in War and Peace: Ottoman-Polish rela-
tions in the 15th–19th centuries (Istanbul: Ministry of Culture, General 
Directorate of Monuments and Museums, 1999), 12.
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their Western European counterparts.38 Remark-
ably, the image of a “Turk,” or an “Ottoman,” was 
highly ambivalent and combined fear and fascina-
tion. On the one hand, Poles criticized the Ottoman 
dynasty’s adherence to Islam (referred to as 
“paganism”) and despotism in their style of ruling 
the state. On the other, they admired Ottoman 
wealth, power, and order.39 It was not a coincidence 
that Oriental dress and armor were adopted by 
Polish nobles, who happened to be confused with 
Ottomans during their visits at Western European 
courts.40 The nobility’s Oriental stylization of their 
appearance and lifestyles was an expression of 
Sarmatianism (Sarmatyzm)—an ethno-cultural 
phenomenon spanning from the sixteenth well 
into the end of the eighteenth century.41 Indica-
tive of the phenomenon’s complexity is the fact 
that the climax of the folly for Oriental fashions 
among the nobles coincided with the period of the 
seventeenth-century Polish-Ottoman wars. In 
addition, Tatar, Crimean Karaim, and Armenian 
minorities played a considerable role in bringing to 
the Commonwealth elements of Oriental culture 
that were reflected in armor, furniture, clothes, and 
the lifestyle of the nobility, as well as a number of 
the Ottoman Turkish words that found their way 
into the Polish language and are still in use today.42
38 Adam Balcer, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, and Natalia Królikowska (ed.), 
Orzeł i Półksiężyc: 600 lat polskiej publicystyki poświęconej Turcji 
(Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2014), 11.
39 Kołodziejczyk, “A historical outline of Polish-Ottoman,” 12–13.
40 Ibid.; Jan Kieniewicz, “Polonyalılar, Doğu ve Oryantalizm/ Poles vis-
a-vis the Orient and Orientalism,” in Polonya Sanatında Oryantalizm/ 
Orientalism in Polish Art, ed. Tadeusz Majda (Istanbul: Pera Müzesi, 
2014), 13.
41 More on Sarmatianism and the Polish nobility’s fascination with the 
Orient, see: Jan Kieniewicz, “Orientalność Polska,” in Sąsiedzi i inni 
(Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1978), 76–93.
42 Ananiasz Zajączkowski, “Orientalistyka Polska a Bliski Wschód,” in 
Szkice z Dziejów Polskiej Orientalistyki, ed. Jan Reychman (Warsaw: 
PWN, 1966), 7–8.
However, the importance of Polish-Ottoman rela-
tions in the Polish tradition hardly corresponds 
with the place of Poland in the Ottoman and 
Turkish collective memory. In the first quarter 
of the nineteenth century, an aspiring Orientalist 
Józef Sękowski translated fragments of Ottoman 
chronicles pertaining to Ottoman-Polish rela-
tions.43 To his great disillusionment, the space given 
to Poland by Ottoman historiographies was much 
scarcer than he had expected. References to Poles 
and Poland were to a large extent limited to wars 
against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and 
the Poles’ participation in the Holy League.44 
The Treaty of Karlowitz signed by the Polish-Lith-
uanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire 
in 1699 put an end to all conflicts and wars between 
the two countries and begun “a peaceful era” that 
continues until today. Any possible animosities were 
replaced by a joint objective: cooperation against 
the common danger, Russia, and its expansionist 
ambitions. The most telling vignette from this new 
period in Polish-Ottoman contacts is the 1790 
diplomatic mission of Piotr Potocki, the last Polish 
ambassador to the Sublime Porte.45 Its outcome 
was a project of military alliance. The two allies 
declared that it was their obligation to reverse the 
great damage inflicted to the European balance by 
the disproportionate rise of Russia. The project was 
never put into place, and Poland disappeared from 
the map five years later. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Polish and Ottoman diplomats at the time invoked 
the European balance in their treaty suggests that 
43 Józef Sękowski, Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich rzeczy do historyi 
Polskiey służących, v. 1–2 (Warszawa, 1824–25).
44 Kołodziejczyk, “A historical outline of Polish-Ottoman,” 13; For more 
on this subject, see: Hacer Topaktaş, “Stosunki osmańsko-polskie z 
perspektywy tureckiej w zapisach i pamięci/ Ottoman-Polish rela-
tions from the Turkish perspective. Written, unwritten and remem-
bered,” in Herito (Turcja – Türkiye – Turkey) 14 (2014): 50–61. 
45 For more on Piotr Potocki’s diplomatic mission see: Hacer Topaktaş, 
Osmanlı – Lehistan diplomatik ilişkileri: Franciszek Piotr Potocki’nin 
İstanbul elçiliği (1788–1793) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014).
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already in the eighteenth century they regarded 
themselves as members of Europe, responsible for 
that continent’s future and well-being.46
The disappearance of Poland from the map in 1795 
and the subsequent strengthening of its neighbors, 
especially Russia, did not go unnoticed in the 
Ottoman Empire. Ottoman statesmen perceived 
the catastrophic fate of its northern neighbor as a 
warning and a definite sign of the urgent need for 
reform of the Ottoman state.47 After the failure of 
the November Uprising of 1830, the armed rebel-
lion against Russia in the heartland of the parti-
tioned Poland-Lithuania—the semi-autonomous 
Congress Kingdom—the mass migration of Polish 
political and intellectual elites, known in the Polish 
historiography as the Great Emigration, followed. 
Next to France, the Ottoman Empire became the 
chief destination for Polish political émigrés. Poles 
fled to Istanbul in the hope of securing Ottoman 
support in their efforts to regain national inde-
pendence. Given the difficulties to win the definite 
support of either France or Britain for the Polish 
cause, on the one hand, and the enthusiasm of the 
Ottoman statesmen towards welcoming Polish 
emigration within their borders, on the other, from 
the early 1840s onwards, the Ottoman Empire 
turned into a key center of Polish emigration. The 
importance that it held for the Polish national 
activities of the 19th century was stressed by a 
number of emblematic events such as the founda-
tion of the Agency of the Polish Eastern Mission in 
Istanbul in 1841, which became the center of Polish 
political activism against Russia; the establishment 
in 1842 of the Polish village called Adampol/Polon-
ezköy, which in the lands of partitioned Poland and 
beyond gained status as a legend and for years has 
preserved its Polish character; and the organization 
of the Sultanic Cossacks’ Division, commanded 
46 Balcer, Kołodziejczyk, and Królikowska, Orzeł i Półksiężyc, 17.
47 Paulina Dominik, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Lehistan Krallığı: 
Pera’da Polonyalı Çağı,” Toplumsal Tarih Dergisi, no. 242 (2014): 27. 
by Polish officers and manned by Polish soldiers 
during the Crimean War (1853–56). The Polish 
presence in the Ottoman Empire, however, was 
not limited to activities aimed at the restoration 
of an independent Poland. Hundreds of Polish 
émigrés pursued occupations in the Ottoman army, 
administration, diplomacy, road, and telegraph 
construction as well as health services. They 
worked as advisors at the Ottoman court, wrote for 
the Ottoman newspapers, and brought new ideas to 
the Ottoman lands. Polish émigrés were for decades 
actively involved in the reforms of the Tanzimat 
Era (1839–1876), which attempted to modernize 
the Ottoman state. Ottoman dignitaries supported 
their national independence mission and appreci-
ated their contributions to the changes aiming at 
transforming the empire into a modern state.48
The heroism and patriotism of Polish soldiers—who 
after being exiled  from the partitioned Poland-
Lithuania fought in various  independence move-
ments  all over the world in accordance with the 
nineteenth-century motto “For our freedom and 
yours”—was recalled by the chief literati of the late 
Ottoman and early Republican periods. 
For Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869–1944) in his 
poem “Ey, Türk Uyan” (“Hey Turk, Wake Up,” 
1913), written in the midst of the Balkan Wars, 
Polish freedom fighters became a symbol of rebel-
lion against foreign occupation. In his 1916 poem 
“Vernihora’ya” (“To Wernyhora”), inspired by the 
Ottoman soldiers fighting in the Galician front, he 
speaks of the common lot of Poles and Ottomans.49 
48 For more on the Polish emigration in the nineteenth century Ottoman 
Empire, see: Adam Lewak, Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji 1831–
1878 (Warsaw: Gebethner & Wolff, 1935); Kazimierz Dopierała, Em-
igracja Polska w Turcji w XIX i XX wieku (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Po-
lonia, 1988); Paulina Dominik, “From the Polish Times of Pera: Late 
Ottoman Istanbul through the Lens of Polish Emigration,” in History 
Takes Place: Istanbul. Dynamics of Urban Change, eds. Anna Hofmann 
and Ayşe Öncü, 92–103 (Berlin: Jovis Verlag, GmbH, 2015).
49 Sema Uğurcan, “Türk Edebiyatında Lehliler,” Osmanlı Araştırmaları, 
XXVIII (2006): 264, 267.
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Yahya Kemal Beyatlı (1884–1958), who in the 
following years was to be appointed as the ambas-
sador of Turkey to Warsaw, in his 1922 “Istiklalimiz 
Hissi” (“Our Feeling of Independence”) celebrated 
“the fire of independence and freedom” burning 
in the Polish hearts and regarded it as a common 
characteristic between Turks and Poles.50
The heroism of Polish volunteers involved in 
struggles for liberation around the globe were also 
extolled by Nazım Hikmet (1902–1963). After 
leaving Turkey in 1951, Hikmet spent some time in 
Poland, received Polish citizenship, and adopted the 
surname of his great-grandfather Borzęcki. In his 
poem “Lehistan Mektubu” (“Polish Letters,” 1954) 
Hikmet speaks of his Polish ancestry and takes 
pride in it. In the verses of the poem he asks rhetori-
cally: “Was there a place or time when among those 
fighting for freedom there were no Poles on the 
frontline of this struggle?”51 When he finally speaks 
of his experience of exile and homesickness, he 
speculates that his Polish great-grandfather, similar 
to himself, must have also deplored the painful 
possibility of never again being reunited with his 
homeland.52
My final vignette is a story that is frequently 
recalled both in Poland and in Turkey. According to 
it, the 19th century Ottoman court had never recog-
nized the partitions of Poland and had waited for 
the arrival of “the ambassador from Lehistan [the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth].” Whenever 
the diplomatic corps was received by the Ottoman 
sultan, on the sight of the empty chair of the Polish 
deputy, the Ottoman chef de protocol would osten-
tatiously ask: “Where is the deputy from Lehistan?” 
At each occasion, he would receive the same reply 
50 Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, “Istiklal Hissimiz,” in Eğil Dağlar (Istanbul: 
Yahya Kemal Estitüsü, 1966), 239.
51 Nazım Hikmet, “Lehistan Mektubu,” in Yeni Şiirler (1951 – 1959) (Is-
tanbul: Adam Yayınlar, 1989), 30–31. 
52 Ibid. 
from his aide—“Your Excellency, the deputy of 
Lehistan could not make it because of vital impedi-
ments”—to the annoyance of the diplomats from 
the partitioning states. Although this moving legend 
lacks historical evidence, it has nonetheless gained 
popularity both in Turkey and in Poland since 
the times of WWII when it was first “publicized” 
by the former ambassador of Poland to Ankara, 
Michał Sokolnicki.53 Even if not confirmed by 
historical facts, it is certainly telling of the attitude 
of Ottoman statesmen and the spirit of 19th century 
Ottoman diplomacy. At the same time, it has played, 
and continues to play, a significant role in the Polish 
collective memory as a tool of statecraft. In 1989, 
when Poland regained its full sovereignty after the 
fall of Communism, Tadeusz Mazowiecki attended 
the session of the Council of Europe as the first non-
Communist Prime Minister of Poland since 1945. 
He began his speech with the story and concluded it 
saying that “the long-awaited deputy from Lehistan 
had finally arrived”—highlighting that Poland was 
at last a free country.54
53 Dominik, “From the Polish Times,” 94–95.
54 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “From Neighbourhood to Brotherhood: a few 
scenes from Polish-Ottoman and Polish-Turkish Historical Rela-
tions,” in 600. Yılında Türkiye – Polonya İlişkileri Sempozyumu Bildi-
rileri/ Proceedings of the Symposium on the 600th year of Polish – Tur-
kish Relations, ed. Hacer Topaktaş, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın Yayın 
ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 2015), 48–49. 
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C O NS EQ U E N C E S  O F  OT H E R I N G : 
V I RT UO US  C YC L E S  A N D  D OW N WA R D  S P I R A L S  I N  T U R K E Y- E U  R E L AT I O NS
Paul T. Levin 55
There is a vast number of factors that affect 
Turkey’s EU accession process: the reform progress 
in Turkey (or lack thereof ), economics, national 
security, domestic and international politics, voting 
mathematics in EU organs, the legal framework, 
institutions, path dependency, and so on.56 I want 
to focus on one of these factors, one that I think 
lies underneath all the others, either undercutting 
Turkey’s prospects or enabling them. That is the 
question of identity, about what Europe is and who 
can make legitimate claims to be or become part of 
Europe and who cannot. 
My argument builds on a book chapter that in turn 
built on a book I wrote that came out in 2011. I will 
not deal very much with the latest twists and turns 
in the politics of Turkey-EU relations. Instead, I 
want to start with a retrospective assessment and 
then slowly work my way back to today.
My 2011 book dealt with identity within a narrative 
and dramaturgical theoretical framework. I exam-
ined the roles that Muslims and Turks played in the 
stories that Christians and later secular Europeans 
told about themselves. I identified two broad types 
of stories, or rather tendencies:
55 Paul T. Levin is the director of the Stockholm University Institute for 
Turkish Studies.
56 I am grateful for the support of the Swedish Consulate in Istanbul, 
which facilitated my trip to present the paper. The presentation is 
based on a recent book chapter: Paul T. Levin, “Who Lost Turkey? The 
Consequences of Writing an Exclusionary European History,” in His-
tory and Belonging: Representations of the Past in Contemporary Euro-
pean Politics, ed. Caner Tekin and Stefan Berger  (Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2018).
The first I described as a comic tendency or 
metanarrative: one that was outward-looking, 
confident, and associated with representations of 
the Other as alien but not fundamentally so. It was 
also often associated with outward movements like 
the crusades. Here, Muslims were like heathens 
or pagans that could be converted or like heretics, 
almost Christians who had merely gone astray.
The other was a tragic metanarrative: inward-
looking, defensive, one in which Christianity or 
later Europe was under siege from some frightening 
Muslim or Turkish Other. This Other was often 
described using imagery that was exclusionary 
in the sense that the Other was fundamentally or 
irreparably different. Here, he was rather the beast 
of the apocalypse, harbinger of doom, and a punish-
ment for Christian sins, so only by repenting could 
he be fended off.
In my research, I identified these two broad tenden-
cies. They were two different ways of making sense 
of and ordering a much messier real world in which 
there were Muslim-Christian interactions, or as my 
mentor Hayward Alker used to say, “inner-actions” 
within Islamic-Christian civilization rather than 
“inter-actions” between Christian and Muslim civi-
lizations. This imagery and these metanarratives 
were ways in which the guardians of group identity 
sought to tame the messy and fluid reality.
They were social constructs but ones that mattered. 
They were repeated over time and transferred 
between geographies and eras with remarkable 
consistency. Reformation thinkers like Martin 
Luther who rejected much of the medieval Catholic 
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heritage picked up the medieval imagery pretty 
much unchanged. And they were subsequently 
secularized and picked up by Enlightenment 
thinkers like René Voltaire.
To make a long story short, I believe that traces of the 
same two metanarratives or two inclinations—the 
self-confident and expansive comic story and the 
tragic story of a continent that is under siege—can 
be identified even in the present-day debate over 
Turkey’s membership in the European Union. And 
in recent years, the tragic metanarrative appears to 
be experiencing an upswing.
Extreme right parties have made electoral gains 
in most EU member states by telling a story of a 
Europe again under siege by threatening foreigners, 
most prominently Muslims. It is a “tragic” story, 
even apocalyptic in some versions, and it evokes 
the same kind of exclusionary and inward-looking 
identity as that which the early Eastern Christian 
predecessors employed, quite often invoking 
symbolically charged historical battles like the 1683 
Siege of Vienna. Many mainstream European politi-
cians have followed suit and adjusted their rhetoric. 
The question is what this means for Turkey-EU 
relations. I believe that it has had consequences for 
attitudes in both the EU and Turkey towards EU 
accession for Turkey, and that it has contributed to 
the initially cautious but later dramatic democratic 
backsliding that we have seen in Turkey over the 
past decade.
If we first consider some quantitative data57 on 
attitudes in the EU towards this quest and towards 
Turks in general, we find clear indications that 
the long historical legacy of anti-Islamic and 
anti-Turkish imagery in Europe is visible today. 
The Eurobarometer surveys conducted by the 
57 This graph was first published in Paul T. Levin, Turkey and the Europe-
an Union: Christian and Secular Images of Islam (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) and is reprinted with the permission of the publis-
her.
Commission of the European Union have long 
been collecting data on support for EU enlarge-
ment, including the level of support enjoyed by 
specific applicant countries and future or potential 
applicants. As a result, we have data that allows us 
to compare whether, as we would expect in light of 
the historical legacy explored above, opposition 
to Turkey is stronger than to other countries or 
whether it otherwise stands out.
At the time of writing, opposition in the EU to 
letting Turkey enter the EU as a full member is 
strong across the political spectrum and for good 
reasons. The increasingly authoritarian turn of the 
Justice and Development (AKP) government, with 
truly massive purges after the failed coup of July 15, 
2016, the harsh crackdown on dissenters during the 
2013 Gezi protests and beyond, and the suppression 
of freedom of speech, have all combined to turn 
even the most supportive friends of Turkey in the 
EU into critics. Few today, even among supporters 
of Turkey’s EU accession, believe that it is in the 
cards anytime in the foreseeable future. 
However, the Eurobarometer data that we are 
considering here goes back to the period before 
Turkey took this authoritarian turn. In fact, it shows 
that opposition in the EU to Turkey’s EU accession 
increased during the years 2001–2005, which argu-
ably was the period of the most ambitious EU-har-
monizing reforms Turkey has ever experienced. 
Ziya Öniş calls this the “golden years” of AKP 
rule.58 During this period, the death penalty was 
abolished, great strides were taken to abolish the 
practice of torture in prisons and detention centers, 
nine democratization packages were adopted, and 
new civil and criminal codes contained significant 
legislation on women’s rights based on lobbying by 
women’s civil society organizations.
58 Ziya Öniş, “Monopolising the Centre: The AKP and the Uncertain 
Path of Turkish Democracy,” The International Spectator 50, no. 2 
(2015): 22–41.
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 Opposition in the EU toward enlargement to... (1993-2006)
* CYPRUS: Nov-Dec 1994 data missing, Jan 1996 data used as proxy.
** FYROM: (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), “Macedonia” in EB56.2 (2001) and EB58.1  
(2002). Data for 1999 missing, EB54.1 2000 used as proxy.
*** Serbia: “Yugoslavia” in EB56.2 (2001), “Serbia-Montenegro” in EB63.4 (2005). Data missing for 1997, 
EB44.2 Jan-March 1996 used as proxy (“Serbia-Montenegro”).
**** Ukranie: Data missing for 1997, EB44.2 Jan-March 1996 used as proxy.
Despite these strides, public opposition in the EU to 
Turkey’s EU accession increased during this time, 
most likely influenced by factors wholly exogenous 
to the accession process but which stirred up the old 
canon of anti-Islamic imagery. Beginning with the 
eruption of Islamic extremism on 9/11 and a series 
of spectacular terrorist attacks in Europe, peaking 
in 2004 with the gruesome killing of Theo Van 
Gogh and the Madrid bombings, these exogenous 
developments made it easy for the far right to pray 
on discomfort with the idea of a large Muslim-ma-
jority candidate for membership in the European 
“club.”59
Analyses of debates in the European Parliament 
have shown a significant rise in the use of exclu-
sionary imagery and rhetoric after 2002.60 The 
ascent to power in Turkey of a party with roots in 
political Islam—the AKP—arguably worked against 
59 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey–EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate,” 
Insight Turkey 10, no. 4 (2008): 45.
60 Levin, Turkey and the European Union.
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Turkey as far as popular perception in the EU was 
concerned. This rise of the AKP made it easier for 
Turkey’s detractors on the far right to evoke Islam-
ophobic responses when talking about Turkey, 
despite the fact that the AKP during this period 
was busy conducting significant reforms in order to 
harmonize with EU law.
The historical legacy described above and the 
continued practices of Othering Turkey by leading 
politicians in the EU have arguably had serious 
consequences for Turkey–EU relations and have 
also had a negative impact on political developments 
in Turkey. Let us look at two troubling trends with 
respect to the said relationship. First of all, support 
for EU membership in Turkey—once extremely 
strong across almost all demographics—has now 
declined significantly. This is in part a reaction to 
the EU’s “ambivalent and discriminatory approach 
in the application of its conditionality.”61
Another part of the problem is that the two metanar-
ratives can be hard to distinguish from each other, 
even though there are two distinct kinds of opposi-
tion to Turkey’s membership bid within the EU. On 
the one hand, there is a contingent opposition on the 
basis that Turkey at the current time does not fulfill 
the Copenhagen criteria but that accession should be 
welcome when it does fulfill the criteria. The inclu-
sive imagery described above fits in this category, and 
it is typically associated with comic meta-narratives. 
The tragic mode of employment and exclusionary 
imagery, on the other hand, are associated with a 
view that Turkey should not be allowed to join the 
EU because it is predominantly Muslim or (suppos-
edly) culturally alien. However, proponents of this 
latter school of thought have tended to hide behind 
61 S.B. Gülmez, “Explaining the Rise of Euroscepticism in the Turkish 
Political Elite,” in Turkey and the European Union: Facing New Chal-
lenges and Opportunities, ed. F. Cengiz and L. Hoffmann, 102–120 
(London: Routledge, 2013); S. Akşit, Ö. Şenyuva, and I. Gürleyen, “The 
Turkish Parliamentary Elite and the EU: Mapping Attitudes towards 
the European Union,” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 3 
(2011): 395–407.
arguments about the state of Turkish democracy 
(i.e., the Copenhagen criteria), which explains why 
it has been so difficult for many Turks to distinguish 
between the two lines of reasoning. 
Turks have increasingly been saying, “why should 
we listen to you lecturing us on human rights when 
you’re really just using it to keep us out because 
we’re Muslims?” It is quite clear that members and 
supporters of the sitting AKP government nowadays 
use this line of reasoning strategically and, quite 
cynically, to rebut criticism from the EU. However, 
the reason it works is that it taps into widespread 
sentiments among the Turkish population. Unfor-
tunately, this has had a negative impact on the EU’s 
so-called normative power to propel reform in 
Turkey, which today is much diminished.
Second, the early pace of reforms aimed at harmo-
nizing Turkish legislation and policy with the EU 
acquis communautaire had slowed substantially by 
the year 2010, but a shift could be traced as far back as 
2005. Ziya Önis’s “golden age” (2002—2007) consti-
tuted a golden opportunity for the European Union 
to exercise the considerable conditional leverage 
it then held over Turkey and propel it towards 
serious and lasting reforms. Unfortunately, just as 
Turkey was beginning this arduous reform process, 
opposition to the whole project rose in Europe, and 
EU leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and French President Nicolas Sarkozy either added 
caveats to or outright rejected the notion of full 
membership for Turkey. Partly for this reason, partly 
for internal political reasons that have not been my 
focus here, the AKP government soon turned away 
from the serious reform process and eventually 
focused solely on consolidating its power by any and 
all means, leading us to where we are today. 
We are now at a point where “national conserva-
tive” parties on the far right have gained significant 
ground in many EU member states in recent years. 
The rise of these populist parties has shifted the 
B E T W E E N  R A P P R O C H E M E N T  A N D  R E J E C T I O N :  I D E N T I T Y  A N D  C U LT U R A L  D R I V E R S  I N  E U R O P E - T U R K E Y  R E L A T I O N S
26
discourse on topics such as immigration, the place 
of Islam in Europe, and ultimately Turkey’s bid 
for EU accession far to the right. Even though the 
increasing authoritarianism of the governing party 
in Turkey in many respects mirrors developments in 
some EU member states like Hungary and Poland, 
it has provided xenophobic and Islamophobic 
actors in the EU with an easy target. Accordingly, 
the “threat” of Turkish EU accession figured promi-
nently in the Brexit referendum debate, where the 
Vote Leave campaign played on old prejudices and 
fears. 
In many ways, these developments have played right 
into the hands of conservative and anti-Western 
forces in Turkish politics and society, not least 
within the ruling party. Increasingly, Turkish offi-
cials shrug off EU institutions’ criticism of Turkish 
human rights abuses, asserting that the critique is 
mere prejudice or that the EU is in no position to 
lecture those it is asking to care for the refugees that 
EU member states failed to welcome. Following the 
attempted coup on July 15, 2016, cabinet members 
and pro-government pundits lambasted the EU, and 
the West more broadly, for allegedly failing to come 
to the defense of the Turkish people or denounce 
the coup fast enough. A not-so-subtle line or argu-
ment has also emerged holding the United States 
responsible for the attempted coup. In Turkey, too, 
a “tragic” and more or less paranoid metanarrative 
of a country under attack by external forces that 
want to divide and weaken it—along with a set of 
increasingly nationalistic and exclusionary identity 
constructs—has become nearly hegemonic after the 
coup.
What we see in Turkey–EU relations today are the 
centrifugal effects of a vicious circle of anti-Turkish 
sentiments in EU member states and anti-Western 
sentiments in Turkey feeding off each other. The 
historically anchored and increasingly exclu-
sionary representations of the Other are mutually 
reinforcing. Turkish Muslim nationalists invoke 
the conquest of Constantinople when European 
nationalists invoke the Siege of Vienna. In this 
chapter, I have not attempted to show that this turn 
for the worse in Turkey–EU relations is exclusively 
a function of the legacy of writing an exclusionary 
European history. Rather, I hope to have shown 
that this legacy did play a significant role in this 
downward spiral.
In this sense, Turkey was never Europe’s to “lose.” 
But, the saga of Turkey–EU relations in the first 
decade and a half of the new millennium could well 
be told as a tragic story of lost opportunities.
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C O N C I S E  G U I D E L I N E S  FO R  A  N EW  C U LT U R A L  P O L I C Y  I N  A N D  FO R  T H E 
E A ST E R N  M E D I T E R R A N E A N  R EG I O N
Vera Costantini 62
Almost seventy years have passed since Fernand 
Braudel published his famous La Méditerranée, 
highlighting an assumption that would become a 
standing point for historiography: the history of the 
16th-century Mediterranean conjuncture could be 
more appropriately understood if contextualized 
in a larger historical and geographical framework 
that considered the Mediterranean basin and its 
lands as a unique, connected system. Sandy shores 
and cliffs, hilly or flat islands, impenetrable woods 
and terraced high grounds, calm seas or stormy 
winds constituted a diversified shared landscape 
that Early Modern Mediterranean states and 
empires had to contend with. While geographical 
features were susceptible to generalization, the 
strategies of management and survival adopted by 
different states and societies became comparable. 
This comparative approach had a profound influ-
ence on national historiographies, since it showed 
a way to overcome the ideological boundaries 
that had restricted each country’s historical and, 
more broadly speaking, cultural developments 
happening in the aftermath of respective national 
emergencies. In the name of historical generaliza-
tion and comparison, a new cultural integration of 
the Mediterranean seemed possible.
Understandably, in that framework the perspective 
offered by Ottoman documents was considered 
of major importance, and Turkish historians 
were therefore quickly involved in the debate. 
A successful period of intellectual cooperation 
started. In a conference held in June 1974 at the 
“Giorgio Cini” Foundation in Venice, Ömer Lūtfi 
62 Vera Costantini is a researcher at the University of Venice.
Barkan explained to an audience of European 
scholars, including Fernand Braudel, that the 
late 16th-century Ottoman elite also nourished 
an interest in keeping trade with the West alive. 
Strange as it might have seemed to the mainstream 
researchers of European archives, the Ottomans 
were neither always nor necessarily eager to make 
war with Christian states.
Since June 1974 historiography has certainly 
advanced, and relevant work has been done on 
topics requiring an interwoven analysis of French, 
Italian, Ottoman, and Spanish sources. Thanks 
to the efforts of three generations of historians, 
Ottoman studies are no longer considered an 
exotic curiosity. In some cases, far from boasting a 
revolution in historiography, scholars of Ottoman 
history have humbly but efficaciously preferred 
to verify data and interpretations transmitted by 
European national historiographies via Ottoman 
sources. Nevertheless, in my opinion the integra-
tion of this historiographical progress in the 
broader framework of each nation’s cultural policy, 
not to talk about foreign policy tout court, is still 
far from being effective. Most European states 
seem somehow imprisoned in Orientalism’s most 
misleading trap: that of considering the Eastern and 
Southern shores of the Mediterranean as a world 
inhabited by people whose memories, needs, and 
ambitions are irreducibly diverging from “ours.” 
Little emphasis is given to the Mediterranean seen 
as a common ground for analysis and action, while 
risks and dangers involved in eventual partnerships 
are over-stressed. I believe that the systematic 
integration of an Ottomanist standpoint in histo-
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riography as well as of a “Turcological” perspective 
in all social sciences would help overcome this trap 
and prepare the ground for the advent of a cultural 
climate capable of letting us take full advantage of a 
renewed network of trans-Mediterranean partner-
ships. With this paper, I will try to illustrate a few 
guidelines that may facilitate the task.
Firstly, I think that Turkish studies, such as Turkish 
language and literature, Ottoman history, and 
Republican history, should not only be a branch of 
Oriental studies. Unfortunately, in Italy, as in most 
European countries, they are, and as such, they have 
nothing to gain and everything to lose. Academically 
weak, Italian Turcologists and Ottoman historians 
suffer from a structural lack of space of dialectical 
confrontation with other Early Modern historians, 
squeezed as we are between Iranists and Arab-
ists, both groups traditionally interested in topics 
related to literature, philology, or translation. The 
concept of including specialists of the Ottoman 
Empire and of Turkey in Departments of History, 
Philosophy, History of Art, and Sociology, rather 
than among Orientalists, seems to be especially true 
in a country like Italy, where the traces of a common 
past with the other side of the Mediterranean are 
so numerous and substantial. For instance, the 
amount of Ottoman documents conserved in the 
Italian archives is impressive. This would not mean 
to deny any specific “identity,” but rather to create 
a new ground for discussion, leading perhaps to 
job opportunities, the lack of which affects many 
Mediterranean countries, including Italy and 
Turkey. Turkish studies, in other words, is certainly 
a group of specific disciplines requiring a specific 
education, but it should also become a perspective, 
a methodology of systematic comparison, to the 
advantage of cultural and political initiatives taking 
place in the universities of European and especially 
Mediterranean countries.
I would suggest at least five areas of intervention: 
logistical cooperation, greenfield investment plan-
ning, qualified tourism networking, the safeguarding 
of historical heritage, and in-depth media coverage. 
In connection with the respective national institu-
tions, private enterprises, and operators, European 
and Turkish universities should create partnerships 
and joint projects in order to promote concrete 
opportunities of growth and exchange.
As far as logistics are concerned, the maritime 
connections between Mediterranean countries, and 
especially between the Eastern and the Northern 
harbors of the Mediterranean Sea, should be reor-
ganized according to a new rationality based on 
regional and transregional cooperation rather than 
competition. Why should the maritime exchange 
between Italy and Turkey, for instance, be exclu-
sively reduced to the Istanbul/Trieste axis? In Italy, 
port authorities are state owned and have a radically 
different administrative structure to Turkish ports. 
What can we learn by comparing these two alterna-
tive ways of managing maritime logistics? Could 
a new logistical network be reconsidered starting 
from the analysis of the economic needs of the two 
countries’ respective industrial structures?
The logistical issue, in fact, is closely linked to 
industrial partnership. The exchange of goods 
between Germany and Turkey transits via Trieste. 
Nevertheless, a quick glance at the road map will 
show that Trieste serves the Central-Eastern Euro-
pean hinterland more effectively, whereas German 
markets should be preferably reached via Venice 
and Verona. They should be, but currently they are 
not. Comparative research on this topic, conducted 
by some Italian and Turkish universities, preferably 
located in areas that may nourish direct interests 
in opening up new maritime routes, may motivate 
political actors to change the rules and rediscuss the 
Mediterranean roadmap. For several years I have 
worked on this topic with the Venice Port Authority, 
and thanks to a cooperation with LimakPort 
Iskenderun we are now trying to promote a direct 
link between Venice and Iskenderun in the service 
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of European enterprises wishing to contribute to 
Northern Syria’s reconstruction, hoping that it will 
soon be on the agenda.
Several European Union countries, such as 
Germany and Italy, are already among Turkey’s 
most important economic partners, although 
greenfield investments are not necessarily the rule. 
What, I believe, might be further developed is the 
will to create triangular partnerships, involving 
Turkey as mediating partner between EU members 
and Central Asian or Northern and Central African 
countries. Why should Italian entrepreneurs look 
either at Egypt or at Turkey, for example? Wouldn’t 
a partnership be stronger if it were all-inclusive? 
We often hear politicians speak about the need 
to make reforms in order to let our economies 
become stronger and more competitive. Competi-
tive for whom? Other European nations? Turkey? 
Far-Eastern countries? I do not want to sound 
more “Smithian” than I am, but, contrary to what is 
happening now in EU economic planning, isn’t the 
Mediterranean space an area that seems to suggest 
the opportunity for a sensible regional specializa-
tion, especially in the field of the food industry? 
Moreover, if it were European and Turkish univer-
sities involved in creating such opportunities, 
wouldn’t it be easier to promote the issue of healthy 
and environmentally sustainable food production 
and redistribution, possibly asking for Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) sponsorship?
Tourism is currently one of the most successful 
economic sectors in the Mediterranean. Whole 
islands and shores live on tourism. Even former 
industrial establishments have become tourist 
resorts, such as 19th-century Ottoman soap facto-
ries in Crete, now converted into fashionable inns. 
Coming myself from a city that due to mass tourism 
has almost completely lost its basic functional 
facilities, let me warn about the risks of an only-
tourist economic inclination. Tourism makes you 
dependent on foreign economies and standards at 
the costly risk of losing any productive vocation 
and tradition. Even the centuries-old Murano glass 
factories are almost entirely annihilated by Chinese 
competition. The late Ottoman elite understood 
how essential it was to import technological know-
how and machines for political independence; how 
have Italians become a country characterized by 
the chronic lack of an industrial policy and only by 
the triumphant success of the third sector?
An antidote to the pervasive exclusivity of the tourist 
sector might be the establishment of a permanent 
connection with a homogeneously standardized 
policy of the safeguarding, restoration, and devel-
opment of our historical heritage. For once, Italian 
architects, archaeologists, and art historians may 
legitimately claim leadership capacities in this 
issue. Common architectural and artistic traces of a 
shared past might be highlighted in specific tourist 
proposals involving university-based start-ups and 
internships for students of the disciplines involved.
My final point concerns the media and, more gener-
ally, information transfer. The availability of first-
hand sources of information and the evaluation of 
their reliability is at the center of the controversy 
concerning fake news. Therefore, it is not a topic 
just concerning the Eastern Mediterranean. Never-
theless, the Near East is one of the areas in the world 
where it is harder to have access to reliable first-
hand information. Articles are generally written 
from a one-sided perspective that does not leave 
much space for doubts and further consideration. I 
find it hard to believe that, after more than a century 
of modern historiographical debate, journalists 
do not consider a critical analysis of sources as an 
unavoidable methodology, the essential tool for the 
reconstruction of reality. The internet revolution 
truly has provided everyone with constant access to 
countless information but at the same time it would 
be hard not to recognize that historiography has 
lost its most important battle, that of showing the 
importance of a scientific method of analysis in the 
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definition of the topic, in the selection of first-hand 
and second-hand sources and in processing the 
final interpretation. There was a time, in the 1970s, 
when the most advanced historians felt the need to 
conduct research at the service of society as a whole. 
Historical research and history tout court were 
considered the key disciplines to introduce any 
student and any future citizen to an awareness of 
the present. Departments of history were not only 
founded in order to educate future historians but 
also future journalists, diplomats, and politicians. 
I believe that much of their failure was due to the 
incapacity of mainstream historians to fully inte-
grate the Middle Eastern (Eastern Mediterranean, 
Ottoman, “Turcological,” etc.) approach in their 
research. Fernand Braudel’s legacy has not been 
developed to its full potential, and the perspective 
“of the other side” has not been systematically 
investigated in reconstructing the history of Europe. 
Antonio Gramsci wrote that the history of Italy 
could not be written without the consciousness of 
the North and South’s divergent models of develop-
ment, the so-called questione meridionale. Analo-
gously, the history of Europe cannot be written 
without being aware of the question d’Orient. To 
be more precise, now that Ottoman archives are 
available, the history of Europe cannot be written 
without Ottoman sources, which offer the main 
opportunity to check and verify assumptions, theo-
ries, and interpretations. Far from being a matter 
of taking sides, the point is rather to recognize the 
intellectual and scientific need to offer European 
citizenship to Ottoman sources on a permanent 
basis. The Ottomans were not the silent witnesses 
of Europe’s historical actions. The time has come to 
let their voices be heard.
Needless to say, it is already late. This cultural 
standpoint should have been adopted in the 1980s, 
maybe on one of the many occasions when the 
Turkish democrats needed support and recognition 
from la civile Europe. Neither support nor recogni-
tion came. They were left alone, and now we realize 
that by refusing to integrate a Turkish perspective, 
in reality, it is we Europeans who have been left 
alone, on the periphery of the world’s decision-
making processes.
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